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FIRST AMENDMENT TRADITIONALISM
MARC 0. DEGIROLAMI
ABSTRACT

Traditionalistconstitutional interpretation takes political and cultural
practicesof long age and durationas constitutingthe presumptive meaning
of the text. This Essay probes traditionalism'sconceptual and normative
foundations. It focuses on the Supreme Court's traditionalistinterpretation
of the First Amendment to understand the distinctive justifications for
traditionalismand the relationshipbetween traditionalismandoriginalism.
The firstpart of the Essay identifies anddescribes traditionalismin some of
the Court's Speech and Religion Clause jurisprudence, highlighting its
salience in the Court's recent Establishment Clause doctrine.
PartII develops two justficationsfor traditionalism:"interpretive"and
"democratic-populist." The interpretive justification is that enduring
practices presumptively inform the meaning of the words that they
instantiate. Generally speaking, we do what we mean, and we mean what
we do. The democratic-populistjustification is that in a democracy, people
who engage in practices consistently and over many years in the belief that
those practices are constitutional have endowed those practices with
political legitimacy. Courts owe the people's enduringpracticessubstantial
deference as presumptively constitutional. The populist element in this
justificationis that traditionalismis a defensive interpretivemethod against
what abstract principle in the hands of elite actors has wrought:
intolerance, the corrosion of lived experience, and the distortion of text to
mirrora particularclass of contemporarymoral andpolitical views.
In Part III, this Essay compares traditionalism with originalism,
reaching two conclusions. First, traditionalism's reliance on practices as
presumptively constitutive of constitutional meaning is most distantfrom
originalist theories that rely on abstract principle as constituting the
meaning of text and that rejectpractice-basedevidence as the equivalent of
irrelevant "expected applications." It is closest to varieties of originalism
that read text concretely. Yet traditionalistjudges are not engaged in
making guesses about "expected applications," but in making decisions
about retrospective applications-drawingon old and enduringpractices
either to include within, or exclude from, a tradition the specific practice
under review. Second, the Essay investigates the connection between socalled "originallaw" theories of originalism and traditionalism. Original
law theorists argue that originalism is "our law" as a sociological and
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culturalfact. But traditionalismmay be more "our law" than originalism
in some areas within the First Amendment and outside it. If the positivist
defense of originalism truly counts as a justification for any theory of
constitutional interpretation (an issue on which this Essay takes no
position), then it may support traditionalismas much as originalism.
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INTRODUCTION

Traditionalist constitutional interpretation takes political and cultural
practices of long age and duration as constituting the presumptive meaning
of the text. In other work, I have described traditionalism, its influence
across the domains of constitutional law, and possible explanations for and
limitations of the method.' Traditionalism is, in fact, pervasive across the
Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine.
This Essay probes traditionalism's conceptual and normative
foundations. It focuses on the Supreme Court's traditionalist interpretation
of the First Amendment in order to understand the distinctive justifications
for traditionalism in constitutional law and the similarities and differences
between traditionalism and originalism. The first part of the Essay identifies
and describes traditionalism in some of the Court's Speech and Religion
Clause jurisprudence. The Essay highlights traditionalism's recent salience
in Establishment Clause doctrine, where it is gradually but steadily
becoming the Court's preferred method in certain areas.
In Part II, the Essay uses this doctrinal deposit to discuss two
justifications for traditionalism: "interpretive" and "democratic-populist."
The interpretive justification is that while enduring practices may
sometimes diverge from the meaning of text, they are a primary constituent
of textual meaning. That is, enduring practices presumptively inform the
meaning of the words that they instantiate. Generally speaking, we do what
we mean, and we mean what we do. Indeed, we could not have a clear notion
about what many words mean-and especially about how to interpret their
meaning when it is unclear-without attending to the longstanding practices
that illustrate their meaning. True, textual meanings and the practices
1.
See Marc 0. DeGirolami, The TraditionsofAmerican ConstitutionalLaw, 95 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1123 (2020) (hereinafter DeGirolami, Traditions].
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instantiating them are not the same thing. It is possible for there to be a
mismatch between our practices and the meaning of the words we believe
illustrate them. But the presumptive state of affairs is that the text and the
practices instantiating it do match, in constitutional law no less than in other
2
areas such as contract law, with its doctrine of "practical construction." If
lawmaking is a rational activity, there is a presumptive concordance
between our laws and our actions and practices in relation to thembetween what we mean and what we do.
The democratic-populist justification is that in a democracy, people who
engage in practices consistently and over many years in the belief that they
are constitutional have endowed those practices with political legitimacy.
Practices that do not endure, or that have never existed, lack that type of
democratic legitimacy. While courts may, on traditionalist premises, strike
down longstanding practices as unconstitutional, they owe the people's
enduring practices substantial respect and deference as presumptively
constitutionally legitimate. Enduring cultural and political practices reflect
the people's judgments about what is consistent with their fundamental law.
The populist element in this justification is that traditionalism is a defensive
interpretive method against what abstract principle, in the hands of elite
actors, has wrought on the Constitution. Traditionalism is motivated, in part,
by the fear of the intolerance, of the corrosion of lived experience, and of
the distortion of text to mirror a particular class of contemporary moral and
political views, that constitutional interpretation dependent on abstract
principle can unleash. It is an interpretive method for those who cherish
embedded political and cultural ways of doing and being.
In Part III, this Essay compares traditionalism and originalism, reaching
two conclusions. First, traditionalism's reliance on practices as
presumptively constitutive of constitutional meaning departs from some,
but not all, varieties of originalism. It is most distant from originalist
theories that rely on abstract principle as constituting the meaning of text
and that reject practice-based evidence as the equivalent of irrelevant
"expected applications." It is closest to varieties of originalism that read text
concretely. It differs from, but is compatible with, original meaning theories
that take practices and "expected applications" to be "evidence" of meaning,
or to be among the raw materials in the "construction zone." But traditions
and the enduring practices that constitute them are not the same as "expected
applications," though they are related to them. Traditionalist judges are
engaged not in making guesses about "expected applications," but in
making decisions about "retrospective applications"- drawing on old and

2.

For further discussion, see infra Part H.A.
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enduring practices either to include the specific practice under review as
within the tradition, or to exclude it as outside the tradition.
Second, the Essay investigates the connection between so-called
"original law" theories of originalism and traditionalism. Original law
theorists defend originalism from a positivist, rather than a normative or
conceptual, point of view. They argue that originalism is "our law" as a
sociological and cultural fact, as a matter of our extant legal practice. But
this positivist defense of originalism actually also supports traditionalist
interpretation, at least in part. Traditionalism may be more "our law" than
originalism in some areas within the First Amendment and outside it. This
Essay does not adopt the positivist justification as an independent defense
of traditionalism, resting on its conceptual and normative defenses in Part
II. Rather, it explores the structure of the new positivist justification for
originalism, arguing that if it truly counts as a justification for any theory of
constitutional interpretation, then it may support traditionalism as much as
originalism.
I. THE TRADITIONS OF FIRST AMENDMENT LAW

No part of the Constitution has been interpreted traditionally by the
Supreme Court as frequently as the First Amendment, and no part of the
First Amendment more so than the Speech and Religion Clauses. In Speech
Clause jurisprudence, traditionalism figures prominently in the doctrine of
content-based exclusions from free speech protection,3 public forum
doctrine,' government speech,5 and other areas. 6 As for the Religion
Clauses, the Court has interpreted traditionally more frequently in its
establishment cases than in its free exercise cases 7 -for example, when

3.
See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 795-96 (2011); United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010).
4.
See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1992) (plurality opinion); id. at 214-15 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment);
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (describing places "which
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate").
5.
See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 210-12 (2015);
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009).
6.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (political
pamphleteering); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95-113 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 353-57 (1976) (political patronage).
7.
There are some cases at least partially about the Free Exercise Clause that have adopted
traditionalist methods, however. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v.
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 182-85 (2012).
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considering state-sponsored religious displays,8 legislative prayer,9 tax
exemptions,i 0 and more.
This rapid doctrinal canvas already highlights the first crucial feature of
traditionalist interpretation: a focus on political or cultural practices as
constituents of textual meaning. Traditionalism is not focused on judicial
precedents as constituents of meaning. It is not common law
constitutionalism." As Justice Scalia once remarked, the common law "is
not 'customary law,' or a reflection of the people's practices, but is rather
law developed by the judges." 1 2 Traditionalism, by contrast, does take
concrete political and cultural practices to be ingredients of the meaning of
the constitutional text or the text of a doctrinal rule. For example, the Court
has held that it will not find new substantive categorical exceptions to free
speech protection "without any long-settled tradition of subjecting that
speech to regulation" and it has insisted on a careful and narrow description
of the specific political practice at issue even when it considers expanding
the doctrine of categorical exceptions.13
Second, traditionalist interpretation also emphasizes the age and
endurance of practices. Age and endurance are what makes a practice a
tradition. A practice that is both old and enduring-one that people have
engaged in consistently and in concentrated fashion before, during, and after
the ratification of a particular textual provision-is presumed by the
traditionalist interpreter to be consistent with the meaning of the
constitutional text or rule that it instantiates. Where practices are less old,
less continuous, or less dense (continuity and density being the two elements
of endurance), they bear decreasing interpretive authority on traditionalist
premises. Imagine a ski slope: it may be smooth with good snow for skiing
from beginning to the end; or sparse, with interspersed snowy and bare
sections. Sections of the slope that are smooth may be especially sodensely packed with snow-or they may be coated only with a thin, icy
layer. The longer (age) and more continuously smooth (endurance) the
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2086-89 (2019); Lynch v.
8.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671-86 (1984).
See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S.
9.
783, 786 (1983). For further discussion of American Legion and Town of Greece, see infra notes 16-29
and accompanying text.

10.

See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 684-85 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (drawing

the historical lineage of the practice of tax exemption to the Jefferson administration and Madison's
tenure in the Virginia Assembly); see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413

U.S. 756, 792 (1973).
11.

Cf, e.g., David A. Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.

877 (1996).
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
12.
FederalCourts in Interpretingthe Constitutionand Laws, in A MATEER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 4 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997).

13.

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010).
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slope, the better for skiing.1 4 The slope becomes smoother because of the
quantity and density of the snow lying beneath it.
Third, and finally, the strong presumption in favor of even old and
enduring practices may be overcome in two ways: either by directly
conflicting text or by a very powerful moral principle that runs against the
tradition." The presumption of constitutionality for enduring practices is
strong, but defeasible, reflecting one feature of traditionalism's dynamism.
Thus, traditionalist interpretation takes (1) practices; (2) of long age and
endurance; (3) to be powerfully presumptive constituents of textual
meamng.
Two relatively recent Establishment Clause cases involving the concrete
practices of legislative prayer and state-sponsored religious displays are
helpful in identifying traditionalism and exploring certain open questions
about it. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court upheld the
practice of legislative prayer given by members of local congregations in a
small, upstate New York municipality.' 6 The Court concluded that
legislative prayer existed continuously over three distinct periods: during
the colonial period, at the ratification of the Bill of Rights, and afterward.17
It emphasized the age and endurance of the practice, continuing in the
federal and state governments, as a "majority of the other States" maintained
the "same, consistent practice."' 8 Legislative prayer, the Court said, is "part
of our heritage and tradition, part of our expressive idiom." 9 Thus, the
Court's method in Town ofGreece was quintessentially traditionalist: it took
the age and endurance of a concrete practice as constitutive of the meaning
of the Establishment Clause, at least presumptively. 20
The Court's most recent Establishment Clause decision, American
Legion v. American Humanist Association, also reflects traditionalist
themes. The case concerned the constitutionality of a thirty-two-foot cross
that local residents in Prince George's County, Maryland, had dedicated in
1919 to honor the county's fallen soldiers in World War 1.21 In upholding
the cross against an Establishment Clause challenge, a majority of the Court
14.
1 set to the side the thrill-seeking skier who derives perverse pleasure from icy and rocky
terrain.
15.
The preceding two paragraphs condense the explanation of traditionalism developed at
greater length in DeGirolami, Traditions,supra note 1.
16.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014).
17.
Id. at 575-76.
18.
Id. at 576.
19.
Id. at 587.
20.
A legislative prayer practice that "denigrate[s] nonbelievers or religious minorities,
threaten[s] damnation, or preach[es] conversion" either falls out of the tradition or, even if it falls within
the tradition, might be held unconstitutional as running directly contrary to a powerful moral imperative.
Id. at 583.
21.
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2076-78 (2019).
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held that "monuments, symbols, or practices that were first established long
ago" can be imbued with multiple purposes and meanings. 22 "The passage
of time," the Court said, "gives rise to a strong presumption of
constitutionality." 23 The plurality opinion as well as Justice Gorsuch's
concurrence (which Justice Thomas joined) would have gone further,
adopting an approach for state-sponsored religious displays that took a
monument's participation within a tradition long followed in American
government as evidence of its constitutionality. Or, as Gorsuch put it, "a
practice consistent with our nation's traditions is just as permissible whether
undertaken today or 94 years ago." 24
American Legion is a fragmented and perplexing decision, in part
because though a majority of the justices expressed some support for an
Establishment Clause methodology that looks to history and tradition, they
could not reach consensus either about the method's details or its
justifications. The plurality emphasized the age of the specific monument,
symbol, or practice being reviewed.25 Justices Kavanaugh and Thomas
would have combined an inquiry about coercion with history and tradition
to conclude that state-sponsored religious monuments and symbols are not
coercive and therefore constitutional. 26 Justice Gorsuch argued that what
matters is not a particular monument's age, but whether the monumentold or new-fits within a broader tradition of enduring practice. 27
Judging from Town of Greece and American Legion, the justices are
haltingly but steadily moving toward a more fully articulated account of
traditionalism, though they have taken some errant turns. The plurality
acknowledges that a monument's age correlates with its constitutionality,
even describing a "presumption" of constitutionality for monuments,
symbols, and practices of sufficient antiquity (capturing the traditionalist
elements of age and presumptive constitutionality). 28 But it focuses on
objects rather than ongoing practices and it does not account for endurance
in addition to age. Justice Gorsuch rightly focuses on practices rather than
the objects that happen to be in front of the Court, and his is therefore the
richer account of traditionalism, but he omits the features of endurance and
presumptive but defeasible constitutionality that are necessary for a more
completely developed account. 29 Though the justices are beginning to piece
22.
23.

Id. at 2082.
Id. at 2085.

24.
Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (describing a new "history and tradition" approach adopted by the Court).

25.
26.

Id. at 2087-89 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 2096-97 (Thomas, J., concurring in the

judgment).

27.
28.
29.

Id. at 2102-03 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2082 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 2101-03 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment).
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together a traditionalist methodology, they have not articulated any
explanations or justifications for traditionalism.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TRADITIONALISM

This section devises two justifications for traditionalism-one
conceptual and one normative-which it calls "interpretive" and
"democratic-populist." These justifications are not exhaustive. There may
be other reasons to adopt traditionalist interpretation. They are also
independent of one another. Traditionalist interpreters may embrace both or
only one of them. But they reflect two prominent and distinctive
explanations for adopting traditionalism in at least some circumstances. The
first involves a conceptual claim about the nature of textual interpretation
as a presumptively rational activity, while the second sets out a normative
argument about the democratic authority of enduring practices in a
constitutional republic.
A. Interpretive: We Do What We Mean, and We Mean What We Do
The interpretive justification for traditionalism is that enduring practices
are constituents of textual meaning-whether constitutional text or the text
of a doctrinal rule. That is, practices are one of the crucial (though not the
only) ingredients of meaning. There certainly may be occasions where, for
various reasons that can include mistake, oversight, or bad faith, our
practices can deviate from the meaning of the words that they are thought
to instantiate. In the main, however, we do what we mean, and we mean
what we do. Generally speaking, our practices inform the meaning of the
words they illustrate and concretize. In the case of clear text, recourse to
practices is often unnecessary, though even here it may be probative of
meaning. But interpreting unclear text requires a knowledge of the
constituents, or ingredients, 3 0 Of its meaning. 3 1
Consider the following faintly absurd illustration. Suppose a parent
announces the rule, "You must have good manners at the dinner table," to a
young child. There are some words in the rule-"dinner" or "table," for
example-that are clear enough that they probably will need no
30.
See Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 223 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011).

31.
As explained further below, the argument that practices are constituents of meaning is distinct
from the claim that "expected applications" are constituents of meaning. Practices are patterns of
concrete actions and behaviors, while "expected applications," as one theorist has put it, are meanings
that are "intended or expected by the framers and adopters of the constitutional text." Jack M. Balkin,
Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 295 (2007). Nevertheless, there are
connections between certain types of intentionalist originalism and traditionalism that are discussed in
Part III.
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interpretation. Even so, a knowledge of past practice might be helpful to the
child in understanding their meaning: "dinner" is only clear because it refers
and has always referred to the practice of eating a meal in the evening hours.
If "dinner" were associated with a different practice, it would mean
something else.32 But the meaning of the phrase "good manners" is unclear
and presents a starker interpretive problem. The parent could try to clarify
by recurring to another abstraction-for example, telling the child that
"good manners" is the same thing as "polite," ''proper," or "respectful"
behavior. Yet these explanations would only push back the interpretive
problem by one step, introducing other unclear phrases requiring their own
interpretation.
The interpretive justification for traditionalism is that the interpretation
of unclear words requires recourse to past practices, because practices are
constituents of meaning. The child can effectively interpret the meaning of
"good manners" because she knows (or is quickly apprised) that some
practices-eating with her hands, putting her feet on the table, shoveling
unwanted food on the floor for the dog to eat-have been established as
"bad manners," while others-wiping her face with a napkin rather than her
sleeve, using utensils, chewing with her mouth closed-have been
established as "good manners." The practices before and after the rule is
announced, instantiating good and bad manners, concretize and reinforce
the meaning of the rule. And the longer and more consistently the practices
of "good manners" have been reinforced (before, during, and after the rule's
announcement), the more authority they will come to possess as correct
instantiations of the rule.3 3
True, the rule is not synonymous with the practices constituting it. The
parent might forget on occasion to apply the rule or overlook it for some
reason, and in consequence the child might engage in a practice she believes
to be "good manners," perhaps over a long period, only to find out later that
the practice actually is not "good manners." True also, an enduring practice
is not conclusively constitutive of the meaning of the text it is thought to
illustrate. Babbling incessantly might be "good manners" when the child is
very young but might cease to be "good manners" as the child develops and
other behavioral codes supervene. But enduring practices are at least
presumptively reliable guides for the meaning of the words they instantiate.
One can go further. Practices are the primary constituents of textual
meaning, the principal ways in which we come to know what text means.
There may be some cultures in which "dinner" refers to the midday meal, for example.
32.
This account bears some resemblance to the description of practices in ALASDAIR
33.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 191-203 (1981), but it differs inasmuch as
it relies on practices to inform the meaning of the words they instantiate, while for MacIntyre, pursuing
the "internal goods" of practices is the way in which the virtues are cultivated.
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Indeed, consider the alternative: a world in which our practices ordinarily
conflict with the words we think they illustrate would be irrational in the
extreme as well as generally unbearable. The child either would have no
idea at all what the meaning of the rule might be in practice or might even
adopt some sort of perverse meta-rule that "good manners" must mean, as
a general matter, behaving as badly as possible while eating. We cannot
have a clear idea about the meaning of words without attending to the
practices that illustrate them, because in the ordinary course, what we mean
and what we do are mutually reinforcing.34 To interpret words requires
recurring to the practices that concretize their meaning in the world. The
recurrence to practices is ineluctable, even in cases where the interpreter
rejects or replaces an old and enduring pattern of practice-that is, a
tradition-with another. Traditions instruct, and what is learned from them
over long periods of time either confirms or modifies what we believe is the
meaning of the words they illustrate.
This justification for traditionalism is reflected in some of what the
Supreme Court has said about interpretation in its First Amendment
doctrine. For example, in Burson v. Freeman, the plurality opinion upheld
state restrictions on vote solicitation and the distribution of campaign
material within one hundred feet of the polling place.3 5 Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion, which was necessary to the judgment, explained just
what was "traditional" about the "traditional public forum":
If the category of "traditional public forum" is to be a tool of
analysis . . . it must remain faithful to its name and derive its content

from tradition.Because restrictions on speech around polling places
on election day are as venerable a part of the American tradition as
the secret ballot, [the law] does not restrict speech in a traditional
public forum .... 6
The ancient and enduring tradition of govermnent restrictions on speech in
polling places, and streets and sidewalks adjacent to them, rendered these
locations nonpublic forums. Statutes restricting such speech had been in use
"[e]ver since the widespread adoption of the secret ballot in the late 19th
century" and "[b]y 1900, at least 34 of the 45 States .

.

. had enacted such

restrictions." 3 7
Scalia's decisive concurrence in the judgment in Burson helpfully
isolates the interpretive justification for traditionalism. The enduring
34.
See EDWARD SHILS, TRADITION 198 (1981) ("One of the main reasons why what is given by
the past is so widely accepted is that it permits life to move along lines set and anticipated from past
experience . . . .").

35.

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 193-95 (1992) (plurality opinion).

36.

Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

37.

Id. at 214-15.
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practices of state regulation around the polling place are constituents of the
phrase "traditional public forum." Identifying and tracing the legacy of such
practices, Scalia argued, was a superior method for understanding the
meaning of "traditional public forum" than recurring to the Court's "time,
place, and manner" test because the latter was simply a truncated abstraction
of the traditions of government regulation of speech around the polling
place:
This unquestionable tradition could be accommodated, I suppose, by
holding laws . . . to be covered by our doctrine of permissible "time,
place, and manner" restrictions upon public forum speech-which
doctrine is itself no more than a reflection of our traditions. [But that]
... would require some expansion of (or a unique exception to) the
"time, place, and manner" doctrine . . . . It is doctrinally less
confusing to acknowledge that the environs of a polling place, on
election day, are simply not a "traditional public forum" . . ..
Scalia's point is that interpreting phrases whose meaning is unclear
("traditional public forum") by recurring to other phrases whose meaning is
unclear ("'time, place, and manner' restrictions") is less useful than
examining the history of the concrete practices of state regulation of speech
around the polling place. 39 Ancient and enduring practices-those that have
been carried on for many years, continuously, and in concentrated fashionare constituents of the meaning of the "traditional public forum," and
consequently of the scope of this feature of the freedom of speech.
Or consider the Court's justification for its methodology in Town of
Greece v. Galloway.4 0 The practice of legislative prayer endured in
concentrated ways over the colonial period, the ratification of the
Establishment Clause, and thereafter. 4 1 The First Congress-the same
Congress that approved the language of the Establishment Clauseengaged in the practice and subsequent Congresses have ever since.42 And
a "majority of the other States" also maintained the "same, consistent
practice." 43 This enduring pattern of practice is "part of our heritage and
tradition," the Court said.4 Yet it did not clearly explain why "our heritage
and tradition" represents a plausible way to interpret the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. That is, what is it about "tradition" that informs
textual meaning?
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 216 (citation omitted).

Id.
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 576.
Id. at 587.
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The closest the Court came to a justification was this comment:
[I]t is not necessary to define the precise boundary of the
Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice
is permitted. Any test the Court adopts must acknowledge a practice
that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical
scrutiny of time and political change.4 5
In other words, an abstract test defining the Establishment Clause was "not
necessary" because the Court had a more elemental interpretive unit ready
to hand: a practice of the age and endurance of legislative prayer. And
practices of similar age and endurance are likewise presumptively
constitutive of textual meaning-one of the primary building blocks that
generate the meaning of an unclear phrase that remains authoritative in the
absence of some powerful countervailing factor.4 6
Other legal disciplines incorporate the same interpretive insight.
Contract law, for example, recognizes the doctrine of "practical
construction," which holds that courts may recur to the parties' course of
conduct or ongoing pattern of behavior under the terms of an agreement to
interpret its meaning.4 7 A "course of performance accepted . .. is given great
weight in the interpretation of the agreement." 4 8 In some cases, courts have
held that such "practical construction" can even alter the meaning of a
contract that the court would have given it as an original matter and without
such an enduring pattern of practice. 4 9 But the basic point is that other areas
of the law affirm the role of enduring practices in constituting textual
meaning.o Of course, there are salient differences between the
interpretation of laws-constitutional or statutory-and contracts, one of
which is the prominent role of intentionalism in the latter. Yet if anything,
the role and importance of enduring practices is greater for interpreting

45.

Id. at 577.

46.
In Town of Greece, as explained earlier, evidence that the legislative prayer was engaged in
to "denigrate" or "proselytize" might have overcome the presumption in favor of the tradition. Id. at
583. Even in that case, however, the rejection of the practice before the Court would have taken the
existing traditional deposit as its interpretive point of departure.
47.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4}-(5) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).

48.
49.

Id. § 202(4).
See City of New York v. N.Y.C. Ry. Co., 86 N.E. 565, 567 (N.Y. 1908) ("When the parties

to a contract of doubtful meaning . . . enforce it for a long time by a consistent and uniform course of
conduct, so as to give it a practical meaning, the courts will treat it as having that meaning, even if as an
original proposition they might have given it a different one.").
50.
See, e.g., White v. Commonwealth, 6 Binn. 179, 184 (Pa. 1813) ("A construction thus
commenced and thus continued is entitled to the highest respect. The imperfection of language causes
much uncertainty in writings which have been drawn up with the greatest deliberation.").
51.
See generally Mark L. Movsesian, Are Statutes Really 'Legislative Bargains"?The Failure
of the ContractAnalogy in Statutory Interpretation,76 N.C. L. REV. 1145, 1181-88 (1998) (explaining
some of the differences between contracts and statutes for interpretive purposes).
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constitutions and statutes than for contracts.52 Enduring practices stabilize
meaning over time and they also provide notice to third parties about the
meaning of the law, both of which are far less necessary in contract

interpretation than in constitutional law.
To be sure, many questions remain: How narrowly or broadly can a court
draw any given practice to construct a tradition? What criteria does it use to
exclude new practices as not conforming to the tradition, or to include new
53
practices as more broadly within "the tradition" long followed? How old
and enduring must a practice be to qualify as a constituent of meaning, and
at what point does its interpretive power wane or give out? And perhaps
most vexingly: When is the presumptively constitutive quality of traditions,
strong as it is, defeated by other factors-clear text to the contrary, for
example, or an overriding moral principle? Even in the comparatively
unusual circumstances wherein a tradition is defeated, the strength and
endurance of the tradition will itself inform judgments about whether to
retain it. These complications aside, cases like Burson and Town of Greece
illustrate and adopt the interpretive justification for traditionalism: that
when a practice is old and enduring, it is presumptively a constituent of the
meaning of the text that it instantiates.
B. Democratic-Populist:The People'sEnduringDecisions
The second justification for traditionalism combines democratic and
populist elements. By contrast with the descriptive, conceptual nature of the
interpretive justification for traditionalism, the democratic-populist
justification carries a normative charge. It involves a set of claims about the
legitimacy and authority of democratic decisions by non-elite actors with
constitutional dimensions, and what is required for the Court to contravene
them.
In a democracy, traditions often represent the people's decisions about
what accords with their foundational charter of governance. Longstanding
practices, particularly when they are government practices, reflect choices
supported by democratic approval, acceptance, or at the very least political
inertia sufficient to fix them in place. The older and more enduring the
tradition-the more continuous and the more frequently it is reiterated and
re-entrenched-the greater democratic authority it enjoys. Even on
traditionalist premises, arguments to defeat such traditions or to strike them
There are analogues in other disciplines. For example, the law of treaties treats "[a]ny
52.
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation" as constitutive of the meaning of the treaty. See Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), openedfor signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332.
53.
See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2102 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014)).
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down as unconstitutional are admissible, but the democratic authority of
enduring traditions is a presumptive reason to reject such claims.
When the Supreme Court, whose democratic accountability is far less
direct than that of its co-equal branches and state and local governments,
affirms a tradition, it also affirms a set of enduring democratic decisions and
judgments. When the Court upsets a tradition, it is often acting antidemocratically. So, for example, Professor Michael McConnell has argued
that the Court's reliance on the people's "settled judgments" about what
does and does not comport with the Constitution allows the Court to "keep
faith with the democratic postulates of our system" while also exercising an
anti-majoritarian function where government bodies veer wildly from
traditional practices. 54 To repudiate "settled judgments" with democratic
authority breaks that faith and denies that authority; it therefore requires an
especially compelling justification for doing so. Similarly, Professor
Thomas Merrill once justified what he termed "conventionalism" in
constitutional interpretation-which focuses in part on "the evolved
practice of different branches of governments" and the "practice of private
citizens"-on the basis that it constrained the anti-democratic element in
judicial review and promoted popular sovereignty."
Justices on the Court sometimes have had this justification for
traditionalism in mind, as when Justice Scalia defends traditionalism
because it "intrudes much less upon the democratic process" than its
competitors.56 So, too, has the Court in several of its First Amendment
decisions justified traditionalism by invoking the "judgment [of] the
American people" about the scope of free speech protection in the absence
of an enduring tradition of government regulation, or holding that the First
Amendment is not ordinarily triggered by longstanding practices of
government speech because "it is the democratic electoral process that first
and foremost provides a check on government speech."5 8
Several Establishment Clause decisions further crystallize the
democratic feature of this justification for traditionalism as well. In Lynch
v. Donnelly, for example, the Court explained its decision to uphold a
municipality's longstanding practice of exhibiting a religious display during
54.
Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudenceof Tradition, 1997 UTAH L.
REV. 665, 685.

55.

Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 511-12, 522 (1996).

Merrill's conventionalism is distinct from traditionalism because the former emphasizes the interpretive
force of current or contemporary practices.

56.

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia

discusses both originalism and traditionalism in his McDonald concurrence, but his remarks about
democratic legitimacy concern the force of post-enactment practices and patterns of regulation.

57.
Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2015)).
58.
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 207 (2015).
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the Christmas season on the ground that "[t]he city, like the Congresses and
Presidents ... has principally taken note of a significant historical religious
event long celebrated in the Western World."59 The enduring decisions
about religious displays acknowledging the Christmas holiday "by the
people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2
centuries" imbued the practice in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, with powerful
democratic authority that the Court was unwilling to disturb. 6 0 Likewise, in
American Legion, the majority spoke about the "historical importance" that
an old monument-in this case a World War I-era cross-acquired with the
passage of time, "remind[ing] the people of Bladensburg and surrounding
areas of the deeds of their predecessors and of the sacrifices they made in a
war fought in the name of democracy." 6' To strike down the monument as
a violation of the Constitution, the majority suggests, would be tantamount
to striking a blow against what had become an enduring symbol of
democratic self-government as well as the county's democratic decision to
maintain the monument. It would also dishonor the memory of those who
had died to defend the American democratic ideal.
Yet the Court's respectful appreciation in American Legion for "the
community that erected the monument nearly a century ago and has
maintained it ever since," for the decisions of the "relatives, friends, and
neighbors of the fallen soldiers," and for the communal meaning that the
cross had acquired over time and that had united the residents of the county
in "grief and patriotism," all suggest something more than a simple
presumption in favor of democratic choices.6 2 That something more is an
element of populism, one that appears in many other traditionalist decisions
and is often fused with the democratic justification.
When the Court interprets traditionally, it relies on old and enduring
practices at least in part because of its apprehensions about what
constitutional interpretation in the hands of elite actors, perhaps including
itself, has done to constitutional law. It looks to concrete practices, rather
than abstract principles, because interpretation grounded in abstract
principle has frequently tended to uproot and displace certain enduring ways
of life, and to substitute and entrench a particular set of elite cultural and
political preferences. The populist element of traditionalism is a response or
reaction to certain perceived disfunctions in the dominant governing
consensus. And when the Court interprets traditionally, it is participating in
that response. It is concerned with preserving and maintaining various nonelite ways of doing and being in the world against interpretive approaches59.
60.
61.
62.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984).
Id. at 686.
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2089 (2019).
Id. at 2089-90.
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generally grounded in abstract ideals or principles-that would damage or
even destroy them.
Several scholars have observed that judges are highly responsive to and
often influenced by elite values and opinions. Professors Neal Devins and
Lawrence Baum, for example, have argued that Supreme Court justices are
"elites who seek to win favor with other elites"-that is, the intellectual and
cultural class that formed the justices' habits, dispositions, and sensibilities
and with whom they continue to interact both professionally and
personally.63 The Court is often predisposed toward, and prepared to
channel, a set of principles and views that represent a very particular stratum
of cultural and political opinion that comprehends public intellectuals, law
professors and other academics, the upper reaches of the legal profession,
prominent journalists, powerful political networks, and the like. Judges'
cultural perspectives, particularly on social questions, are often shaped by
the academic institutions that conferred their degrees. Technological
advances and "virtual briefing" practices, as Professors Jeffrey L. Fisher
and Allison Orr Larsen have explained, have amplified the federal courts'
access to elite opinion as well as their tendencies to favor it,64 but the general
phenomenon is not uniquely contemporary.
When judges strike down particular traditions as unconstitutionalwhether the traditions are political, religious, cultural, social, or some
combination of these-they are wont to do so on the basis that a principle
of overriding importance requires that result. Equality, liberty, dignity,
neutrality, rationality-these are only some of the most frequently invoked
abstract principles that have been used by the Supreme Court, in some of
the most culturally fraught constitutional contests of the last century, to
strike down a set of enduring practices as violating the nation's fundamental
law. Yet why, one might ask, should a tradition that cannot be justified on
thoughtful, rational, and principled grounds ever survive?
The traditionalist response to this challenge, reflecting a populist
justification, is that "thoughtful" interpretation in constitutional law has
generally meant interpretation that favors and entrenches the values,
principles, and predilections of the educational and cultural elites in
American society. "[T]he thoughtful part of the Nation," as a plurality of
the Court once put it in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, is the part that
embraces "applications of constitutional principle to facts as they had not
been seen by the Court before." 65 It is the part of the nation, as the Court
63.
NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: How PARTISAN DIVISIONS
CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT, at xi (2019).
64.
Jeffrey L. Fisher & Allison Orr Larsen, Virtual Briefing at the Supreme Court, 105 CORNELL

L. REV. 85 (2019).
65.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (plurality opinion).
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said in Obergefell v. Hodges, that influences the Court to perceive "new
insights" about the Constitution derived from "legal principles" that include
"new dimensions of freedom" and "unjustified inequality within our most
fundamental institutions." 66 "All the world is 'concepts,"' as Yuval Levin,
quoting Casey, described this perspective,67 and the application by the Court
of these new principles and concepts often serves precisely to displace and
dismantle traditional practices and replace them with elite cultural
preferences. It is as if the business of constitutional judging involved little
more than a conversation between judges, elite lawyers, and law professors,
and the Court had no need to give reasons for its decisions that are seen as
credible by those that do not share the underlying commitments of elite
actors.
The populist element of the democratic-populist justification suggests
that traditionalism is generally a constitutional approach more suited to the
non-elites of American society-those whose longstanding practices, and
the cultural, communal, and political commitments they instantiate, may not
conform to the ongoing "thoughtful," principle-driven re-imagination of the
Constitution to reflect and impose elite opinion as a national mandate. As
Professor Harold Berman once put it in discussing the historical school
associated with the nineteenth-century German jurist Friedrich Karl von
Savigny, the law should be closely connected with "the ideas and norms
reflected in a people's historically developing traditions, including its legal
tradition." 6 8 Judges may well appreciate this justification for traditionalism
even if they might not necessarily affirm these traditions for themselves in
their own lives.
Once again, some of the Court's First Amendment cases are useful in
pinpointing this justification. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court
69
enduring practice of
upheld a small, lower-middle-class municipality's
in a solemn and
members
board
town
to
place
offering a prayer "intended
deliberative frame of mind, invoke divine guidance in town affairs, and
follow a tradition practiced by Congress and dozens of state legislatures"
against the claim that it violated the Establishment Clause's abstract
66.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596, 2603, 2606 (2015).

Yuval Levin, Taking the Long Way: Disciplines ofthe SoulAre the Basis ofa Liberal Society,
67.
FIRST THINGS MAG. (Oct. 2014), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/10/taking-the-long-way [http

://perma.cc/XY9J-7AL2].
Harold J. Berman, The Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13, 16 (2005). For
68.
further reflections on the German historical school and its several insights for the American law of
religious liberty today, see MARC 0. DEGIROLAMI, Part II: Tragedy and History, in THE TRAGEDY OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 55 (2013).
The Town of Greece's population is just over 95,000 people whose median household
69.
income is $58,000. For demographic information about the Town of Greece, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/search-results.html?q=town+of+greece%2C+ny&page=1 &stateGeo=-none&se
archtype-web&cssp=SERP&charset_=UTF-8.
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principle of religious neutrality.70 As Justice Alito put it in his Town of
Greece concurrence, the Town's "informal, imprecise way" of selecting
guest chaplains is "typical of the way in which many things are done in
small and medium-sized units of local government," and when these towns
seek "in good faith to emulate the congressional practice" of legislative
prayer, the Court should not disrupt those practices simply because they do
not conform to the justices' own preferences and values. 7 1 To impose those
preferences would render "local government . .. a religion-free zone," and
in consequence destroy the enduring "historic practice," which was, in fact,
what the Second Circuit had suggested would be its own preferred outcome
when it struck down the practice.72
Traditionalist justices sometimes say that they are interested in what they
claim to be distinctively American popular traditions as embodied in old
and enduring American practices, but what they sometimes seem to mean
is the practices of non-elite Americans. As the Court emphasized in
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, a government speech case arising in
another small, blue-collar town 73 that concerns the expressive function of
physical monuments for local governments, traditionalist interpretation
protects "American" traditions, stretching back to the founding and before,
that reflect the "history" and "local culture" of particular communities-not
the broad and uniform principles of elites, either here or abroad, that would
destroy such traditions.74 Likewise, Justice Scalia stressed the "long usage
of our people" in his decisive Burson concurrence as of particular
importance for traditionalism, but what he seems to have intended is that
traditionalism preserves the enduring practices of American localities and
small governments in managing their electoral processes for the protection
of democratic republican ideals.
It should be emphasized that like traditionalism's interpretive
justification, the democratic-populist justification is presumptive only, not
conclusive. A tradition that flatly contradicts constitutional text will not
survive, no matter how much it may reflect enduring democratic or populist
choices. Likewise, there are times where a tradition violates a moral or
political principle of great power that defeats it-and rightly so. In these
situations, its democratic and populist bona fides fail as a defense against its
70.
71.
72.

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014).
Id. at 597 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id.

73.
See QuickFacts:Pleasant Grove City, Utah, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/pleasantgrovecityutah/PSTO45218
[http://perma.cc/DA7E-R889]
(approximate
population 38,428 and approximate median income $70,000).

74.

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009).

75.

Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 216 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis

added).
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constitutionality. To give perhaps the best-known and most notorious
example in all of constitutional law, the practice of segregating railroad cars
on the basis of race was once defended by the Court as one of the
"established usages, customs, and traditions of the people," even though the
actual age and endurance of the practice of segregation by race in railroad
76
cars was, in fact, actually relatively recent at the time. Yet the moral
principle of racial equality, as an interpretation of the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause, together with other sociological and psychological
considerations, were sufficiently compelling to reject that ostensible
tradition. 7 The Court has made analogous points in First Amendment
contexts, and even on traditionalist premises, there are ways to vindicate a
variety of interpretive and political interests that may run counter to old and
enduring practices. 78 Nevertheless, for traditionalists, these situations are
not the presumptive state of affairs. Rather, traditionalism takes the age and
endurance of practices to bear the hallmarks of presumptive democratic
authority, and it accords such practices the respect that the people's
decisions ordinarily deserve in a democratic republic.
III. COMPARING

TRADITIONALISM AND

ORIGINALISM

This part compares traditionalism with originalism, once again relying
on some of the First Amendment doctrine discussed earlier to sharpen
certain points of contrast. The comparison is worth undertaking both
because originalism is one of the dominant theories of constitutional
interpretation today and because there are important similarities and
differences between the methods. Both show some respect for (or at least
do not show an open hostility toward) the authority and wisdom of the past,
though for somewhat different reasons. Both rely on historical evidence for
understanding the meaning of constitutional text, though each gives
different weight to historical evidence before, during, and after ratification
of the meaning of particular constitutional provisions, and each emphasizes
different features of history.79
This Essay cannot canvas the relationship between originalism and
traditionalism comprehensively, so it instead focuses on two particularly
salient issues: first, the ways in which theories of original meaning and
original intention overlap and depart from traditionalism with respect to the
interpretation of unclear text; second, the extent to which a recent positivist,
76.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896), overruledby Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954); cf R.R. Co. v. Brown, 84 U.S. 445 (1873) (interpreting a federal statute preceding the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid racially segregated railway cars).

77.
78.

See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
For discussion, see DeGirolami, Traditions, supra note 1, at 1130, 1168-70.

79.

On the axes of weight given to different types of historical evidence, see id at 1167-68.
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A. Traditions and Retrospective Applications
Originalism is an umbrella category under which many varieties exist,
some of which are closer to and some more distant from traditionalism.80
Original public meaning theorists, as distinguished from intentionalist
originalists, are all interested in the meaning of the constitutional text
communicated to the public at the time of its enactment. But public meaning
originalists disagree among themselves about how to derive the meaning of
text when it is unclear"' (or about the "meaning of meaning" in such
cases),82 and it is this issue that provides a first profitable point of contact
and comparison with traditionalism.
Some public meaning originalists derive meaning when interpreting
unclear text by employing what they call "the method of text and
principle," 83 in which the abstract "principles" that are "embodied" in the
text are taken to be its meaning for purposes of new applications. 84 Some
originalists in this general methodological line read unclear text with a
"presumption of liberty,"8 5 but other abstract values such as equality,
nondiscrimination, neutrality, the principles espoused by various
progressive (or, for that matter, conservative) "social movements,"86 and
others would also fit within this variety of original meaning. Other original
meaning theorists speak of a difference between interpretation and
construction, the latter of which concerns the effect given to the meaning of
words, a particularly vexing issue when that meaning is unclear.87 These
theorists have described a "construction zone" which "becomes the focus of
80.
For discussion, see Marc 0. DeGirolami, The Vanity ofDogmatizing, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
201 (2010) (book review).
81.
1 am using the phrase "unclear" as a catchall term for text that is ambiguous, vague, or
otherwise under-determinate.
82.
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2015).
83.
Balkin, supra note 31, at 295.
84.
Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and ConstitutionalRedemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
427, 498, 502 (2007).
85.
See Steven G. Calabresi, On Originalism and Liberty, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 17, 39
(2016) (stating that the Constitution's original meaning is "very libertarian so long as one insists that
laws regulating rights must be 'just' and that they must serve 'the general good of the whole' people");
see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
118-21 (2004).
86.
Balkin, supra note 31, at 299-308.
87.
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence B. Solum,
OriginalistTheory and Precedent:A Public MeaningApproach, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 451, 456 (2018).
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explicit attention when the meaning of the constitutional text is unclear, or
the implications of that meaning are contested." 88 Some take a
comparatively ecumenical or at least noncommittal view of the "normative
concerns" that might be used to derive meaning in such circumstances,89
while others emphasize the "original function," "spirit," "point," or
"purpose" that the text was thought to serve. 90 Still other public meaning
originalists focus on "original methods," the interpretive rules in place at
the time of a particular provision's ratification. 9 1 These theorists reject
exercises in constitutional construction in cases where the applicable rules
or methods cannot settle an interpretive issue.9 2
This is an extremely compressed account of only a limited number of
some prominent accounts of original public meaning on one particular
issue-the procedure for interpreting unclear constitutional text. But it is
sufficient to identify one important point on which these theories intersect
with traditionalism: their view of the effect of enduring legal practices on
meaning. No original meaning theory gives primacy to ancient and enduring
practices as constituents of meaning, so that none is synonymous with
traditionalism on that point at least. Indeed, very few original meaning
theories specifically discuss the interpretive force of old and enduring
practices at all. Nevertheless, one can see these theories on a continuum
from those that elevate particular abstract principles (such as freedom or
equality) as the exclusive touchstones for constitutional interpretation of
unclear provisions, to those that are more ecumenical or noncommittal
about what falls into the "construction zone," to those that reject principled
or "spirited" interpretation when fixed interpretive rules or conventions run
out. Original meaning theories that look to abstract principles to interpret
unclear text are likely to admit and exclude very different applications than
traditionalist interpretation, since "principled" interpreters will be guided
not by enduring practices but by their sense of what allegiance to their
favored principles-or to the ones that they purport to locate in the
Constitution-demands. Original meaning theories that look to concrete
rules or methods of interpretation extant at the period of a textual
88.

Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.

453, 469 (2013).
See id. at 469-72.
89.
See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of
90.
Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1 (2018); Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content,
89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 500 (2013) (for "point" and "purpose"). Just precisely what the difference
is between a "principle" and a "spirit" or overarching "purpose" is not entirely clear.
91.
See JOHN 0. McGINNis & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION (2013); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, OriginalMethods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 751 (2009)
[hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, OriginalMethods].
McGinnis & Rappaport, OriginalMethods, supra note 91, at 783-84.
92.
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provision's ratification are likely to align more closely with concrete and
enduring practices extending before, during, and after ratification.
A related, unresolved issue between original meaning and original
intentions theorists concerning the role of future, concrete applications of a
constitutional provision may shed even more light. Some theorists who look
to original intentions do so because they believe that the concrete intentions
of the authors or ratifiers of constitutional text about its application
constitute the meaning of that text. 9 3 If the authors or ratifiers of a text
affirmatively did not believe-or, indeed, would be horrified at the
prospect-that it would apply to a specific issue, then it seems to these
theorists perverse and objectionable from a democratic perspective for a
court today to authorize that application. 9 4 Original meaning theorists have
taken a variety of positions on the interpretive force of so-called "original
expected applications." 95 Advocates of the "method of text and principle"
reject expected applications outright, since what matters for them is whether
the abstract principle said to embody the text may be extended by modern
courts to encompass new applications, whether or not envisioned, endorsed,
or repudiated by the authors and ratifiers. 9 6 Other original meaning theorists
say that they "do not recommend relying entirely" on expected applications,
because the authors or ratifiers may have been mistaken even if they had
conceived a particular application. 9 7 But a substantial number take the view
that expected applications may be "evidence" or "probative" of textual
meaning, though always inconclusive evidence.9 8 For example, Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that it is, in the main, highly improbable that
meaning and expected application will diverge, and that such expectations
will "often be . . . the best evidence of what that meaning is." 99 Professor
Solum writes in a similar and helpfully precise vein:
If the meaning of a given string of constitutional text (or clause Cl)
is ambiguous and could have two senses (Si and S2), and
constitutional actors at a time, T2, that is proximate to framing and
ratification of Cl, acted in a way that provides evidence that they
believed the meaning was S1 and not S2, then those actions are
93.

See, e.g., Smith, supra note 30.

94.

Id.

95.
This phrase "expectation originalism" was first used, so far as I have been able to trace it, by
Ronald Dworkin in 1997 in critiquing Antonin Scalia's lead essay in A Matter of Interpretation.See
Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 12, at 115, 119.
96.
Balkin, supra note 31, at 295.
97.
Barnett & Bernick, supra note 90, at 46.
98.
Keith Whittington may be in this group, though he has some highly critical remarks about
expected applications. See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism:A CriticalIntroduction, 82 FORDHAM L.

REV. 375, 382-86 (2013).
99.
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principlesas the Core of
Originalism,24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378 (2007).
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evidence that the meaning was in fact Si. On the other hand, if T2 is
not proximate in time to the framing of ratification of Cl, then its
evidentiary value is diminished. And even early historical practice
provides evidence that must be evaluated and weighed against other
evidence: early historical practice might reflect mistaken beliefs
about original meaning or a deliberate circumvention of the true
meaning for various reasons. 00
Expected applications are not the same thing as the enduring practices
that constitute the meaning of text on traditionalist premises. Expected
applications are concrete intentions about the future application of text to
some specific issue or question, while enduring practices are ancient,
continuous, and concentrated actions, customs, or patterns of conduct
undertaken almost always, as I have argued,'0 1 in the belief that they
comport with the meaning of the words they instantiate, thereby becoming
ingredients of that meaning and reinforcing it. Nevertheless, there is a
connection between old and enduring practices and expected applications.
Old and enduring practices give the traditionalist interpreter presumptive
confidence that a particular application is, or is not, warranted; an
application squarely within the tradition is constitutional; one squarely
outside the tradition is not. But enduring practices also allow the
traditionalist interpreter to extrapolate the meaning of text going forwardthat is, when the issue before a court involves a similar, but not identical,
practice whose fit within the tradition is uncertain. Elsewhere, I have
described an analogous traditionalist technique as the "narrowing" or
"broadening" of a tradition either to exclude or include the particular
practice under review as within the tradition.1 02
For example, in Town of Greece v. Galloway, Justice Kagan argued in
dissent that the tradition of legislative prayer recognized by Marsh v.
Chambers and extending back to the founding did not encompass a smalltown meeting attended by members of the public as petitioners,' 0 3 while
Justice Kennedy and, later, other judges, argued for broadening
constructions of the tradition of legislative prayer that encompassed the
practice used by the Town.' 0 4 Likewise, Justice Brennan once argued that
Lawrence B. Solum, Themes from Fallon on Constitutional Theory 22 (Dec. 5, 2018)
100.
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=3374241 [https://perma

.cc/A2GQ-LDYR].
101.
102.

See supra Part I.A.
See DeGirolami, Traditions,supra note 1.

103.

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565,616 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("The practice

at issue here differs from the one sustained in Marsh . . . ."). In this part of her dissent, at least, Justice
Kagan was evaluating the case from within a traditionalist methodology.

104.

See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chino Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 910 F.3d 1297,

1303 (9th Cir. 2018) (O'Scannlain, J., respecting denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Town of Greece,
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the tradition of state-sponsored religious symbols, if any exists, should be
drawn narrowly, and that it must include evidence of the specific practice
before the Court from the time of textual ratification: "at the time of the
adoption of ... the Bill of Rights, there was no settled pattern of celebrating
Christmas, either as a purely religious holiday or as a public event." 0 5 Other
justices in these and other First Amendment controversies have opted for
broader characterizations to encompass the practices the Court was
examining as within the applicable tradition. 10 6
The technique of broadening and narrowing a tradition is not so much an
exercise in divining the expected applications of the founders or ratifiers of
a textual provision, so much as one in retrospective application-taking an
existing tradition that clearly is, or is not, an illustration of constitutional
text and discerning whether it encompasses a practice that does not fit within
the focal or central examples of the tradition but nevertheless may lie within
it.1 0 7 Professor Solum comes closest in the paragraph above 08 to clarifying
one originalist response to the interpretive relevance of past practices along
these lines: while he acknowledges the evidentiary value of past practices
for textual meaning where the practices are "proximate to framing and
ratification," there are two salient differences with traditionalism.' 09
First, Solum only grants past practices "evidentiary" force as compared
with the constitutive force they have for traditionalists. As a practical
matter, this may not make a significant difference, but it does matter
conceptually. Original meaning theorists do not recur to practices as the
primary interpretive unit. They instead prefer to talk about "meaning"
without giving practices any interpretive lexical priority or presumptive
weight. Not all original meaning theorists rely on practices as "evidence" of
meaning, but even those that do will not start and generally end with
practices. Practices are simply one component of a basketful of original
meaning "evidence" that are not given any presumptive interpretive
authority. Second, for Solum, proximity to framing and ratification is the
key factor in measuring the interpretive force of past practices," 0 while age
572 U.S. at 577) (arguing against a standard requiring a tradition that is identical with the "precise
practice at issue").

105.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 720 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

106. See, e.g., id. at 686 (majority opinion). For another dispute about narrowing and broadening
the tradition of substantive-based exclusions from free speech protection, see United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010).
107. On the claim that these sorts of techniques might render a focus on tradition overly
manipulable, see Chad Flanders, A Half-HeartedDefense of the CategoricalApproach, 95 WASH. U. L.

REv. 1389, 1400 (2018) ("I do not think that tradition is infinitely malleable.... Tradition seems more
.

constraining than a direct appeal to values . .
108. See Solum, supra note 100.

109.
110.

Id. at 22.
Id
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and endurance before, during, and after framing and ratification (or,
metaphorically, a long and smooth ski slope throughout) are paramount for
traditionalists." 1
Traditionalism is therefore closest to those originalist theories that read
the text concretely-as tethered closely to those ancient and enduring
practices that were and are thought to instantiate the meaning of unclear
text-even as it differs from even those originalist theories as to the
evidentiary power of traditions for the meaning of the Constitution. As was
seen in Part II.B, traditionalism's emphasis on enduring practices is justified
by democratic-populist reasons and the constraining features of such
reasons on the scope of judicial discretion. Here, too, the connection with
originalism is complex. While early accounts of originalism-including
public meaning originalism-emphasized the beneficently constraining
quality of originalism on judges,' 1 2 these justifications have been
complicated, if not altogether dismissed, in more recent originalist
defenses.1' 3 Many originalists today are not motivated to adopt originalism
for its capacity to protect and promote democratic governance. On this
point, as well as on the more general suggestion that "methodologies don't
constrain . . constitutions constrain,"' 1 4 there may be significant differences
between traditionalism and originalism, since judicial constraint in the
service of democratic-populist ends is an important reason to adopt
traditionalism in the first place.
B. Is TraditionalismOur Law (of the FirstAmendment)?
In his insightful division between "positivist," "natural law," and
"historical" schools of jurisprudence, the legal historian Harold Berman
once characterized originalism as positivist in orientation-as deriving its
authority from "a body of rules laid down ... and enforced by the supreme
lawmaking authority"' 15-while historical approaches focus on the "legal
history[] of the nation" and its transmission in practices over time as an
ongoing "tradition."ll 6 Though Berman may have been right to suggest
some fundamental perspectival differences among the schools, there are
nevertheless historical elements, and even natural law varieties, of

111.

See DeGirolami, Traditions, supra note 1.

112.
113.
(2017).
114.

Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989).
See, e.g., William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2213

115.

Harold J. Berman, The Origins ofHistoricalJurisprudence:Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE

Id. at 2218.

L.J. 1651, 1653 (1994).
116. Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality, History, 76
CALIF. L. REV. 779, 793 (1988); see also Berman, supra note 115.
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originalism,' 17 as well as positivist elements of traditionalism, so that each
may partake of the overarching jurisprudential disposition of the other to
some extent.
The positivist elements of both originalism and traditionalism represent
another fruitful point of comparison between them. Over a series of papers,
Professors William Baude and Stephen Sachs have defended public
meaning originalism on a positivist, rather than a normative or conceptual,
basis. Baude, for example, has claimed that originalism is "our law"-that
"our current constitutional practices demonstrate a commitment to inclusive
originalism"" 8 or that the "social facts" of our existing interpretive practices
support originalism, or at least originalism understood in a broad and
"inclusive" fashion.' 19 Originalism is "our official story," Baude and Sachs
argue, as a day-to-day matter about what our constitutional law actually is
and what our legal practice reflects. 12 0 Baude defends the claim that
originalism is "our law" against objections that in fact there are many nonoriginalist features of constitutional interpretation and adjudication
(precedent that does not conform to original meaning, for example) by
adopting an "inclusive" account of originalism: original meaning is the
"ultimate criterion" but it may "incorporate" or "permit" other interpretive
or adjudicative techniques consistent with itself.12 1 Nevertheless, "the most
serious challenge to our view," Baude and Sachs write, "ought to be an
empirical one: whether originalism is or isn't the official story of our
law." 1 2 2
Traditionalism offers Baude and Sachs this sort of empirical, practicebased challenge, and it draws evidentiary power in part from First
Amendment doctrine and what the Supreme Court says and does (or says
that it is doing). In certain doctrinal areas, and particularly in certain pockets
of First Amendment law, what the Supreme Court says that it is doing-the
"official story of our law" that it tells, applies, and transmits
intergenerationally 12 3-when it interprets the meaning and limits of the
Speech and Religion Clauses is traditionalist, not originalist. As discussed

117. The historical elements of originalism are clear and have already been discussed. For natural
law-infused accounts of originalism, see, for example, LEE J. STRANG, ORIGINALISM'S PROMISE: A
NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2019); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C.

Walsh, EnduringOriginalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97 (2016).
118. William Baude, Essay, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2349 (2015).
119. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 Nw. U. L. REV. 1455, 1457,
1491 (2019).
120. Id. at 1489.
121. Baude, supra note 118, at 2355-61.
122.

Baude & Sachs, supra note 119, at 1459.

123.

See Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 250 (1986) ("Traditions depend

on real or imagined continuities between past and present. These continuities may be formalized and
institutionalized as they are in the institutions of law and religion . . . .").
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in Part I and at greater length elsewhere,1 24 the Court's doctrine in the areas
of content-based exclusions from free speech protection, public forum
doctrine, government speech, legislative prayer, state-sponsored religious
displays, tax exemptions, and others is traditionalist, not originalist. And the
First Amendment is not the only area where the Court's constitutional
methodology is and has long been traditionalist.1 2 5 Frequently, the Court is
explicit that it is looking to "tradition" or "our heritage" or taking account
of "American practices" to resolve disputes in these areas.1 26
Conversely, the Court has only very rarely, if ever, adverted to
originalism as its default methodology in these substantive areas. More
importantly, apart from what the Court says, it does not engage in the sort
of originalist analysis that it uses in other cases where it has expressly
adopted (and, often enough, expressly named) originalism.1 2 7 In many ways,
the positivist defense of originalism mounted by Baude and Sachs is a much
more natural conceptual fit for traditionalism: the interpretive "social
practices" 28 the justices use are, perhaps not surprisingly, to investigate the
age and endurance of other social and political practices in determining the
Constitution's meaning. It's social practices all around. But that point aside,
on the empirical question of what "our official story" is when it comes to
constitutional interpretation: (1) what the justices do; (2) what the justices
say they are doing; and (3) what the justices do not say they are doing-all
three of these pieces of empirical data often point much more directly
toward traditionalism than originalism. Not always, of course, but at least
as often as they indicate that "our story" and our fundamental criteria for
interpretive authority are originalist. The only additional bit of evidence a
traditionalist might desire would be an explicit declaration in no uncertain
terms by the Court that it is not adopting originalism in these cases.
Professors Baude and Sachs might respond to this traditionalist challenge
in a few ways. They might say that their inclusive originalism is capacious
enough to encompass or incorporate traditionalism. That is, the Hartian rule
of recognition 29 -the ultimate rule specifying what counts as law at all, or
the "rule that determines which rules are binding"130-remains originalism,

124. DeGirolami, Traditions, supra note 1.
125. See id. (documenting traditionalism across the constitutional domains, in areas including
inherent executive authority, executive appointments and removals, the Speech or Debate Clause, the
Pocket Veto and Presentment issues, and several constitutional amendments).

126.
127.

See id. at 1176-78.
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the Court used both

originalist and traditionalist method. See DeGirolami, Traditions,supra note 1, at 1149-50.

128.
129.

Baude & Sachs, supra note 119, at 1463.
See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-10 (2d ed. 1994).

130.
Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Rule of Recognition (and Does It Exist)?, in THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 235, 237 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma eds.,
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and traditionalism is simply one technique among others that the Court
sometimes uses that is consistent with originalism. Thus, for example,
Professor Baude's study of the "liquidation" of textual meaning over time,
which is similar in some, but not all, respects to traditionalism, may fit
within a larger positivist originalist architecture. 1 3' The "first layer of legal
citations"l3 2 that may actually appear in the Court's opinions does not really
matter so much as the underlying and often unstated theoretical assumptions
and commitments. Baude and Sachs might also suggest that one way to test
whether originalism encompasses and incorporates traditionalism is to
imagine a case where they conflict-where a tradition has arisen and
endured that was not consistent with the best view of the meaning of a
textual provision at the founding. Baude and Sachs might contend that in
such unusual cases, the original public meaning defeats the tradition, as
even traditionalists appear to admit in conceding that the presumption in
favor of a tradition may be overcome by directly contrary text. Finally,
Baude and Sachs might say that though traditionalism reflects the Court's
actual doctrinal practice in some areas, and even its self-consciously
adopted methodology, constitutional doctrine reflects only one piece of
sociological evidence about what "our law" actually is; other evidence, such
as the justices' expressed views in other public contexts-Justice Kagan's
comment that "we are all originalists,"1 3 3 for example, or Justice Alito's
comment that he is "a practical originalist"' 34 -iS more strongly supportive
of originalism than traditionalism.
These points can be answered, however. First, while the idea of an
"inclusive originalism" that can "incorporate" other non-originalist methods
and techniques is coherent, as originalism becomes increasingly inclusive,
the concrete evidence for originalism as the rule of recognition becomes
increasingly thin. Indeed, perhaps it eventually becomes so thin that its
coherence begins to dissolve as one starts to wonder exactly what sort of
evidence of legal practices Baude and Sachs have in mind and just how it
constitutes "better evidence" about what is "our law" than what the Court

2008). For purposes of this Essay, I take Baude and Sachs's characterization of Hart's and other legal
positivists' arguments about the rule of recognition at face value.
131. See William Baude, ConstitutionalLiquidation, 71 STAN. L. REv. 1 (2019). But Baude notes
that liquidation may be useful not only for originalists but also for other interpretive approaches. Id. at

35-47.
132. Baude & Sachs, supra note 119, at 1480.
1 33. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
UnitedStates: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 11 I th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Elena
Kagan).
134. Baude, supra note 118, at 2352-53 (quoting Matthew Walther, Sam Alito: A Civil Man, AM.
SPECTATOR (May 2014), https://spectator.org/articles/5873 1/sam-alito-civil-man [https://perma.cc/79P

M-JETQ]).

1682

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:1653

says and does in its constitutional doctrine. At the very least, it becomes
harder to test the thesis as it becomes more theoretical and impractical.
The point is not so much about whether the Court invokes originalism as
a veneer or pretense for some other actual practice that it uses to resolve
cases, as Professor Mikolaj Barczentewicz has argued in criticizing the
Baude and Sachs view.' 35 Nor is it that there are other plausible candidates
for what "our law" is from an external point of view-the point of view of
legal sociologists or legal theorists attempting to describe what the Supreme
Court does rather than what it thinks it is doing. 13 6 Rather, it is that both as
a matter of the "official story" and as a matter of the "practical" or "actual
story"-both from the internal point of view of the relevant legal actors137
and from the external, factual, point of view-the Court often invokes
traditionalism, and not originalism, to explain its interpretive approach. The
Court's higher-order justification (or "what we tell ourselves, not just what
we do on the ground")13 8 as well as what the Court actually does "on the
ground" frequently point squarely in traditionalism's direction. Thus, the
advantage of taking traditionalism, rather than originalism, to be "our law"
in such cases is that it places the argument about what "our law" is within
the core of our constitutional system's actual, self-reflective doctrine and
practice, rather than in the realm of a theory about what "our law" might be
that becomes harder to falsify just exactly in proportion to its increasing
inclusivity.
Second, however, Baude and Sachs may have a stronger response in
proposing a thought experiment about what would happen in a case of direct
conflict between the original meaning of text and an old and enduring
tradition thought to instantiate that text. If traditionalists themselves
concede that traditions and the text that they constitute could conflict, and
that in such cases of conflict, the presumption in favor of the tradition may
be defeated, then isn't originalism really "our law"? While the point is
powerful, its strength diminishes once one sees its practical and empirical
limits. For reasons I have discussed earlier in justifying traditionalism
conceptually and interpretively-that is, that in the main, what we do and
what we mean coalesce-situations of direct and clear conflict between the
meaning of the constitutional text and the traditions instantiating it are

135.

Mikolaj Barczentewicz, The Illuminati Problem and Rules of Recognition, 38 OXFORD J.

LEGAL STUD. 500, 503-04 (2018).
136. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 118, at 1487-90.
137. See HART, supra note 128, at 98 (describing the internal point of view as concerning the rules
that people use to "apprais[e] . . their own and others' behaviour" and that are acknowledged as
legitimate).
138. Stephen E. Sachs, The "Constitution in Exile" as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2253, 2265 (2014).
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extremely infrequent.1 39 What is far more frequent is that the Court recurs
to traditions once it finds some quantum of under-determinacy or lack of
clarity in the meaning of the text. And the more willing the Court is to
identify a lack of clarity, the more readily it will rely on traditions as
constitutive of textual meaning. 14 0
For example, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, which concerned the meaning
of the Recess Appointments Clause, Justice Scalia argued in his
concurrence in the judgment that traditionalist interpretation is unavailing
in the face of plain meaning directly to the contrary, for "[p]ast practice does
not, by itself, create power." 14 1 And yet in practice, the Noel Canning
majority's willingness to use its considerable discretion to find textual
ambiguity permitted it to move seamlessly to the old and enduring traditions
that ultimately disposed of the case.142 What is "our law" in Noel Canning:
the surface-level statement that clear text prevails, or the actual resolution
of the case using traditionalist methods? If anything, as discussed earlier,
certain First Amendment cases demonstrate that the absence of evidence of
the specific practice being reviewed in the founding generation is
insufficient to defeat a tradition, provided the practice before the court may
be characterized, using a process of retrospective application, as broadly
within the tradition.1 4 3 Cases like Lynch v. Donnelley and Town of Greece
v. Galloway1" therefore suggest that a tradition can survive even when it
does not have strong original meaning support. Lack of evidence of original
meaning is not the same thing as a direct conflict with original meaning, of
course, but it remains to be seen what the Court would do if it actually did
ever confront a case where original meaning and traditionalist meaning
directly conflicted. Until it does, and we obtain some evidence for what the
social facts of adjudication are in such cases, the question of originalism or
traditionalism's interpretive mastery over the other is unknown.
What is known, however, is that the "official story" told by Professors
Baude and Sachs, one that "trace[s] developments from the Founding" and
that they say "isn't very controversial"1 45 as an account of "our law," does
not fully capture the methodology the Court uses when it interprets
traditionally. The Court certainly includes founding-era evidence but its
139.

See supra Part II.A.

140.

See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014).
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Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (quoting Medellin

v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008)).
142. See id. at 523-33 (majority opinion); see also Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory
Interpretation,129 HARV. L. REv. 2118, 2135-36 (2016) (reviewing ROBERTA. KATZMANN, JUDGING
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most traditionalist decisions often explore and rely on colonial and precolonial historical precedents. Similarly, the Court often depends at least as
heavily on post-ratification developments as on founding-era history when
it traces the lineage and endurance of a tradition of practice. One might even
say that to the extent the Court has adopted originalism in these cases, it is
precisely because founding-era evidence of historical practice is only one
piece, albeit a powerful piece, of reliable evidence within the Court's larger
traditionalist frame.
Finally, with respect to other sources of evidence for "our official story"
beyond constitutional doctrine, traditionalists can point to similar dicta or
extra-judicial statements, including by some of the judges Baude and Sachs
mention, that seem to support traditionalism at least as much as originalism
as the rule of recognition. Justice Kagan recently said in her American
Legion concurrence that "I too 'look[] to history for guidance,"' though she
declined to issue a broader statement about the role of history and tradition
in Establishment Clause doctrine. 146 Justice Kavanaugh embraced a "history
and tradition test" in his American Legion concurrence,1 47 and he has
expressly supported the role of traditionalism in constitutional interpretation
elsewhere.1 4 8 Neither of these justices spoke about originalism in their
remarks. Justice Gorsuch has likewise frequently supported traditionalism
in constitutional interpretation and elsewhere,1 4 9 and, as Professor
Christopher Green puts it, "it is clear that he would interpret much of the
Constitution in light of tradition.""so These justices are not alone; indeed,
this list does not include Justice Scalia, arguably the most traditionalist
justice ever to sit on the Court, and there are many others that could have
been included.1 "' If extra-doctrinal sources count as evidence for the "our
law" claim, then one certainly can find plenty of statements at least as
supportive of traditionalism as originalism. And yet, doctrinal statements

146. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2094 (2019) (Kagan, J., concurring in
part) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 2087 (Alito, J., plurality)).
147. Id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
148. See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh,
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Statutory Ambiguity and ConstitutionalExceptions, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1907, 1919 (2017)
(observing that "[r]equiring judges to focus on history and tradition" might make evaluation of certain
legal questions clearer).
149. See, e.g., NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 19-47,
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in American law").
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and methods ought to carry special force as evidence of the law of the
Constitution. If what we are interested in is "our official story" of
constitutional law, what the Court does, says, says that it is doing, and does
not say that it is doing, should all count as powerful empirical data
supporting a positivist theory of our law.
This Essay does not claim that the positivist defense of originalism
provides a third justification for traditionalism supplementing the
interpretive and normative justifications discussed in Part II. To do that, it
would have to embrace the "our law" claim as a true justification for any
interpretive theory, but there are powerful reasons to doubt that it is.
Professors Jeffrey Pojanowski and Kevin Walsh, for example, have posed
important questions about why anybody should adhere to the originalist rule
of recognition identified by Professors Baude and Sachs, as well as just
whose internal point of view matters in locating that rule.1 52 This Essay
takes no position on those important, highly theoretical questions, and it
prescinds from any overly ambitious claims about traditionalism as actually
being "our law" to the exclusion of anything else, since the evidence merely
points to its being "our law" some of the time (though, it must be said, in
increasing degrees). The point is instead to test Baude and Sachs's
"descriptive doctrinal sociology"' 53 and to show a positivist point of contact
between originalism and traditionalism. If one were inclined to find the
positivist account of originalism persuasive, then one should find it at least
as, if not more, persuasive for traditionalism.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has long used traditionalism to resolve controversies
across the domains of constitutional law. This Essay has identified and
described traditionalist constitutional interpretation in the Court's First
Amendment doctrine, justified it on interpretive and democratic-populist
grounds, and reached two conclusions about traditionalism's relationship to
originalism. Many questions remain about traditionalism in constitutional
interpretation, including why it seems to be more powerful as the Court's
preferred method in some textual and doctrinal pockets than in others, how
judges go about drawing traditions narrowly or broadly, and at what point
the strong presumption in favor of a tradition begins to weaken or give out
altogether. Yet it seems probable that traditionalism's influence will
strengthen in the coming years, particularly in the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence. If it does, then the Court will have to (1) iron out various
internal differences among the justices about the method; and (2) grapple
152.
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with traditionalism's fundamental justifications and its relationship to
originalism. This Essay represents some small, but steady, steps toward
these ends.

